While the Chinese have made inroads into Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka, Myanmar, the Indian Ocean Islands and Bangladesh as part of its ‘string of pearls policy’ of encirclement, India has been trying to cast its strategic net well beyond the region. With large volumes of energy and trade for China coming from West Asia and Africa, it is inevitable that the Chinese will attempt to ensure Indian Ocean SLOC security. After all, at current levels of consumption, India’s oil import dependence is expected to rise to 91.6 per cent by 2020, while in the case of China it will be 76.9 per cent. Spiralling demand for energy from India, China and Japan has led to an inevitable and enhanced sensitivity around the security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and of choke points which dot the entrances of the Indian Ocean. Unfortunately, the focus of the movement seems to have diffused now, while it meanders along with its meetings - the most recent one held in the United Arab Emirates.Ĭhina has been making increased forays into the Indian Ocean Region(IOR) in the interests of energy security and trade. It created the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2008 with enthusiasm from all participating littorals.
Given the atmospherics, India - with its large maritime capacity - has attempted to play the role of an ‘unobtrusive fulcrum’ and a ‘balancer of power’ in the region. The fate of numerous regional or sub-groupings is better in some cases as they cater exclusively to regional aspirations. Multilateral forums, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), formed in March 1997, have an economic agenda and are presently widely considered moribund. The region has become ripe for geostrategic competition due to the presence of mutually distrustful littorals, who have prevented the creation of an overall security architecture, despite similar priorities and a common interest in maritime operations. The new players are primarily India and China, with Australia, Indonesia and South Africa occasionally playing the role of aspirant kingmakers. There is growing participation in the area from other major players seeking primacy along with the US. This struggle has intensified as a consequence of the ‘imperial overstretch’ of US forces, and a commonly perceived erosion of US influence. Most importantly, it is an area that has become witness to a jostle for power, and subsequent shifts in the dynamics of the region. The ‘activity’ in the Indian Ocean region is defined by extensive trade, energy transfers and a spectrum that ranges from political turbulence on one end, to threats from piracy, terrorism and transnational crime on the other. Thus, the words attributed to the maritime strategist Alfred Mahan ring true: ‘Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.’ This is particularly true in the context of the struggle for gaining maritime influence in the region. The Indian Ocean is a very ‘active’ ocean, perceived by many as the emerging centre of gravity in the strategic world.
Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific
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